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We examine whether the information contained in social media (Twitter, 
Facebook & Google Blogs) and web search intensity (Google) influences 
financial markets. Using a multivariate system and focussing on Eurozone’s 
peripheral countries, the GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) 
as well as two of Eurozone’s core countries (France and the Nethelands), we 
show that social media discussion and search-related queries for the Greek 
debt crisis provide significant short-run information primarily for the Greek-
German and Irish-German government bond yield differential even when 
other financial control variables (international risk, Eurozone’s risk, default 
risk and liquidity risk) are accounted for, and to a much lesser extent for 
Portuguese, Italian and Spanish sovereign yield differentials. Social media 
discussion and Google search-related queries for the Greek debt crisis do 
not affect spreads in France and the Netherlands. 
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1. Introduction  
Social media have progressively become a popular open forum for analysing 
economic/financial topics and a field where the public sentiment is reflected in real time. 
They are widely used by influential economic commentators, policymakers and their 
followers. For instance, 2008 Nobel Laureate in Economics and The New York Times 
Columnist Paul Krugman had, at the time of writing, approximately 1.26 million Twitter 
account followers, whereas International Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine 
Lagarde had approximately 232,000 Twitter followers. Further, “hot” economic topics 
like the Eurozone crisis and the Greek debt crisis are covered and discussed in great 
detail by dedicated websites (for instance in the The Wall Street Journal and The 
Financial Times). It has been argued that this “storehouse” of precious information 
might be contributing to the explanation of upcoming movements in financial markets. 
Smith (2012) finds evidence for this in currency markets. Da et al. (2011) and Joseph et al. 
(2011) find evidence that online search activity predicts price movements in the (very 
liquid) U.S. equity markets. Even in the less liquid environment of residential home sales, 
Beracha and Wintoki (2013) find that online search activity predicts price changes. In 
motivating why an increase (or decrease) in the volume of search intensity predicts 
changes in asset prices in one direction, Joseph et al. (2011) and Beracha and Wintoki 
(2013) argue that, behaviourally, buyers are more likely to use search engines before 
making stock or residential real estate purchases than are sellers who already hold the 
assets and do not need to “search”, and as such, one should expect a positive 
relationship between the prices of those assets and search intensity.  
The importance of online search activity has received the attention of the financial 
press. On April 18th 2013, Financial Times commentator Gillian Tett noted that investors 
can track investment returns with growing precision by plugging into social media.1 A 
recent fake tweet reflects the power of social media and the cost of inaccurate 
information in an era where the speed at which information travels is unprecedented.2  In 
fact, it has been suggested that financial markets are more influenced by negative press 
rumors than by fundamentals (see Hasan et al., 2013).  
 
                                                 
1 Gillian Tett on “Markets Insight: Wake up to the Twitter effect on markets”, The Financial Times, April 
18, 2013. 
2 A fake tweet on April 23rd 2013 from a hacked Associated Press account (asserting that explosions at the 
White House had injured Barack Obama) wiped more than $130 billion off the value of the S&P 500 (The 
Economist; see http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21576671-hacked-tweet-briefly-
unnerves-stockmarket-newscrashrecover. Date accessed: Tuesday 4 November 2014). 
3 
 
Our paper focuses on the determinants of the sovereign cost of borrowing. Being 
one of the largest capital markets,3 the sovereign bond market has important implications 
for the ability of a sovereign as well as the private sector to manage effectively their 
borrowing needs. Rapidly rising government bond yields add to the burden a country 
faces to borrow in international markets and therefore undermine its ability to roll 
existing debt over at a low cost. The fact that the country has to roll its debt over at high 
interest rates worsens its fiscal prospects, making default more likely. In this sense, the 
crisis of confidence can become a “self-fulfilling prophecy” (see e.g. Krugman, 2011). At 
the same time, higher sovereign borrowing costs translate into higher corporate 
borrowing costs through the sovereign risk effect. For instance, Aguiar et al. (2009) and 
Aguiar and Amador (2011) note that a rise in sovereign debt increases the risk of higher 
future corporate taxes or the expropriation of private investments at the same time while 
reducing the ability of the government to offer implicit guarantees to the private sector. 
Ağca and Celasun (2012) note that since both corporate and sovereign debts are subject 
to the same country-specific macroeconomic risk factors, creditors seeking portfolio 
diversification would handle their overall exposure to a given country irrespectively of 
whether lending is channeled to the public or the private sector.  
Consequently, a rise in government debt pushes corporate borrowing costs higher. 
Indeed, Ağca and Celasun (2012) find that an increase in sovereign debt by one standard 
deviation from its mean is associated with 9% higher loan yield spreads in emerging 
markets. Using data on 118 non-financial companies in the Eurozone area over the 2008-
2011 period, Bedendo and Colla (2013) identify significant spillover effects from the 
sovereign to the corporate segment; according to their estimates, 1% increase in 
sovereign risk translates into a 50 basis points increase in corporate credit risk. According 
to a special report by Deutsche Bank (2013), the higher cost of sovereign cost of 
borrowing is indeed felt by small and medium-sizes enterprises (SMEs) in Eurozone’s 
periphery. The report estimates the average interest rate on loans to “sole proprietors 
and unincorporated partnerships” (a proxy for small and medium-sized enterprises) in 
Italy/Spain at 300 to 400 basis points above the German level.  
Given the importance of the sovereign debt market for both the public and private 
sector, the focus of our paper is on the impact of the volume of activity in social media 
                                                 
3 According to the Global Financial Development database of the World Bank, global outstanding 
domestic public debt securities accounted for 32.6% of global GDP in 2011 whereas global stock market 
capitalization accounted for 31.5% of global GDP.  
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(Twitter, Facebook & Google Blogs) and web search intensity (Google Trends) on the 
sovereign spread between the GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) and the 
German long-term government bond yield during the Greek debt crisis. We believe that 
the recent Greek crisis provides a natural platform for empirically investigating the role 
of social media in the debt market over and above the impact of the information 
provided by other financial control variables (idiosyncratic default risk, liquidity risk, 
Eurozone’s risk and international risk). As the Greek crisis escalated, the term “Grexit” 
(Greece’s exit from the single currency) was added to the financial vocabulary. During 
this period, the Greek spread rose to unprecedented levels contributing further to the 
risk of contagion in Eurozone’s other peripheral countries. Greece, which was bailed-out 
twice (for €110bn in 2010 and then again for €109bn in 2011), negotiated, in February 
2012, a new €130bn rescue package involving a voluntary haircut of some 53.5% on the 
face value of its bonds held by the private sector. Eurozone ministers agreed (in 
November 2012) to cut Greece’s debt by a further €40bn. Ireland was bailed-out for 
€85bn in November 2010. Portugal was bailed-out for €78bn in May 2011. Spain was 
granted, in July 2012, financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
for up to €100bn. Despite the bail-outs, international markets remain volatile and worried 
that the debt levels of all GIIPS could be unsustainable (this is reflected, for instance, on 
Spanish and Italian government yields that are still elevated) posing a risk to the entire 
Eurozone.4 These concerns appear justifiable as the GIIPS account for around 34.3% of 
Eurozone’s GDP (Italy is the third and Spain is the fourth largest Eurozone economies) and 
run both current account deficits and high debt-to-GDP ratios.5  
It is clear that web search intensity could be linked to both rising and falling 
spreads. Indeed, search intensity is mainly triggered upon the arrival of news 
(supplementary information) which can be either good or bad. News for a country’s 
economic fundamentals (or even political stability) can be understood as signals that 
convey valuable pricing information especially for financial securities issued by the 
government. Consider the case where a released information set shortens the distance to 
default for a country (bad news). This will trigger the immediate interest (reflected also in 
                                                 
4 Following from the pledge of European Central Bank President Mario Draghi to do “whatever it takes” 
to save the Euro (in July 2012), the European Central Bank approved (in September 2012) a plan paving the 
way for the bank to make unlimited purchases in struggling Euro members' bond markets (such as Italy and 
Spain) with the aim of lowering their government bond yields. The plan was conditional on struggling 
governments to sign up to a Eurozone program of budgetary discipline. 
5 Italy accounts for 17.3% of Eurozone GDP. Spain accounts for 11% of Eurozone GDP, whereas 
Greece, Portugal and Ireland account for 2.3%, 1.9%, and 1.8% of Eurozone GDP, respectively 
(Eurostat). 
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Google's search intensity) of both bondholders and potential bond buyers (bondholders 
from all member-states could be influenced). Assuming that the risk tolerance of 
individual and institutional investors declines with increasing risk and that bondholders 
and potential bond buyers update their information set (with bad news), the following 
occurs. On the one hand, bondholders, who were marginally tolerant with respect to the 
prior risk level, are now expected to liquefy their assets and, indeed, as the level of risk 
escalates, an even increasing number of investors are expected to do so. In this case, a 
growing supply of bonds is observed. On the other hand, faced now with a higher level 
of risk, potential bond buyers, who marginally accepted the previous risk level, will be 
less willing to buy, and, indeed, as the level of risk escalates, an even increasing number 
of potential bond buyers are expected to do so. In this case, a lower demand for bonds is 
observed. The very demand and supply mismatch in the bond market will only be 
eliminated by rising spreads. It becomes evident that once we concentrate our attention 
on a clearly defined sample where bad news persist, then we may argue that search 
intensity is linked to rising spreads.  
To assess the impact of the volume of activity in social media (Twitter, Facebook 
& Google Blogs) and web search intensity (Google Trends) on the sovereign spreads in 
the GIIPS, we use the Breitung and Candelon (2006) causality test in the frequency 
domain (B&C, hereafter). We choose to employ the B&C test because it embraces some 
features that cannot be traced in the standard linear Granger causality test which is 
conducted in the time domain. The advantages of the B&C test can be summarized as 
follows: (i) it distinguishes between short-run and long-run causality, (ii) it allows the 
identification of causal relationships even if the true interdependence between two 
variables is non-linear in nature, (iii) it allows us to condition upon a set of relevant 
variables avoiding potential spurious causality inference, and finally (iv) the test is valid in 
the presence of volatility clusters, a common characteristic of financial variables. 
Therefore, in certain circumstances, the B&C test may reveal hidden channels of 
causality that otherwise would not be identifiable.  
We demonstrate that social media discussion and Google search queries for the 
Greek debt crisis provide significant information for explaining the spread between the 
cost of borrowing in Eurozone’s peripheral bond market and Germany over and above 
the information provided by other financial control variables (idiosyncratic default risk, 
liquidity risk, Eurozone’s risk and international risk). For comparison reasons, we also 
report results for France and the Netherlands, two of Eurozone’s core countries where 
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borrowing spreads remained immune to the unprecedented rise recorded in the spreads 
of the GIIPS.6  
Our main findings are summarized as follows: First, we identify short-run causality 
from social media and Google search queries data to the Greek and Irish spreads. 
Second, there is evidence of short-run causality running from the Greek spread to social 
media discussion. Third, there is some weak (and information-set sensitive) evidence of 
predictability of Greek-debt related social media discussion and Google search queries 
for Portuguese, Italian and Spanish spreads. Arguably then, bad news related to the 
Greek debt crisis and circulated via online activity, had a negative impact on Ireland (the 
smaller peripheral countries amongst the GIIPS) especially since the country had a very 
weak fiscal position (in 2010-2011, Ireland recorded a much higher fiscal deficit than the 
remaining GIIPS). Furthermore, exposure of banks in peripheral countries to Greek 
public and private debt might explain why there is some evidence of predictability for the 
GIIPS. Unsurprisingly, as the Greek debt crisis evolved and Greek creditworthiness took 
a hit, the market price of Greek debt declined rapidly and consequently, banks exposed 
to Greek debt witnessed a weakening in their balance sheets. At the same time, the lower 
market price of Greek debt had an adverse impact on the value of collateral banks 
needed to secure wholesale funding and triggered margin calls requiring the posting of 
additional collateral. Fourth, Google carries different short-run predictive information 
relative to social media. Although Google is used by a wider base, social media (especially 
Twitter) have become a very popular way of keeping track of news and directing 
“followers” to news analysis (e.g. in blogs) in an extremely speedy way. Fifth, the 
borrowing costs in a set of Eurozone’s core countries (France and the Netherlands) 
remained immune to social media/Google queries information related to the Greek 
crisis. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 of the paper discusses the 
implemented methodology. Section 3 reviews briefly the determinants of sovereign 
spreads and discusses the dataset used in this paper. Section 4 reports our empirical 
results. Finally, Section 5 discusses our findings and offers suggestions for future 
research. 
                                                 
6 France is the second largest Eurozone economy accounting for 21.4% of Eurozone GDP. The 
Netherlands is the fifth largest Eurozone economy accounting for 6.3% of Eurozone GDP. 
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2. Methodology 
Consider the structural bivariate system 1( ) ( )
t t t
L L

 z Θ C u Ψ u  with ( , )t t tS G z . In 
the context of the Breitung and Candelon (2006) framework (B&C, hereafter), the non-
causality hypothesis at frequency ω  is tested by: 
2 2
ω ω
12 11(ω) log 1 ( ) ( )
i i
G SM e e
 

    
  
              (1) 
where 
11  and 12  are derived from a VAR moving average representation. In case 
where 
tG  does not cause tS  at ω , (ω)G SM   is zero and 
2
ω
12 ( ) 0
ie  . B&C remedy 
the estimation complexity of 
2
ω
12 ( )
ie  through a set of restrictions imposed on the 
VAR coefficients. B&C restate the null based on    12 22 12( ) 1 ( ) ( )L c L L      . 
221 c  is positive
7 element of the 1C   and ( )LΘ  is the determinant of ( )LΘ . The null 
hypothesis of no causality at frequency ω  running from 
tG  to tS  is not rejected 
whenever (2) holds:  
12 12, 12,
1 1
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p p
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k k
k k
e k k i 
 
    ω ω ω       (2) 
with 12,k  to be element of the kΘ  matrix. The set of restrictions imposed are:
8  
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1
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If we denote 11,j j   and 12,j j  , the VAR equation that corresponds to the tS  
variable may be rewritten as: 
  1 1 1 1 1... ...t t p t p t p t p tS S S G G                    (4)  
Thus, the null hypothesis is equivalent to the following set of restrictions:  
    1
cos( ) ... cos( )
( ) 0, ,..., ( )
sin( ) ... sin( )
ω ω
ω    where  and ω
ω ω
p
p
R R
p
   
     
 
   (5) 
To assess the validity of (5) for frequencies ω  that range within (0, ) , B&C compare the 
obtained statistic with the 0.05 critical value of the 2  distribution with 2 degrees of 
freedom.  
                                                 
7 This is due to the assumption that the variance-covariance matrix is a positive definite.  
8 Given that sin( ) 0k ω in the cases where 0ω and ω , it comes that the second restriction in (3) is 
simply disregarded.  
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Hosoya (2001) proposed a method that eliminates from the variables of interest the 
one way feedback due to a third variable, while the initial feedback structure remains 
invariant. For instance,9 in the multivariate system ( , , )t t t tS G z m  with tm  to be the 
vector that contains the conditioning variables, let 
tw  denote the projection residual 
vector obtained by projecting 
tm  into the Hilbert space 1 2( , , , ,...)t t t tH S G  z z . Similarly, 
let 
t  and t  represent the projection residual vectors obtained by projecting tS  and tG , 
respectively, into Hilbert space 
1( , ,...)t tH w w . After the described transformation, 
Hosoya (2001) argues that a higher order conditional causality measure can be expressed 
equivalently by the bivariate causality measure  
/ (ω) (ω)G SM M  m .  
 
3. Data issues and determinants of sovereign spreads  
As discussed in the Introduction, to ensure that web search intensity is linked to rising 
spreads, it is important to select a sample period where released (and related to the Greek 
case) news disclose predominantly negative information. To determine a period with 
such a physiognomy in a justifiable way, we utilize as a “guide” the search intensity for 
news in the Google trends facility. Initially, we select two composite keywords, “Greece 
crisis” and “Greek debt crisis”.10 Substantial search intensity for the above keywords can 
determine candidate periods for investigation. At a second stage, in order to ensure that 
the events taking place during the determined periods communicate principally bad news, 
we backdate and examine all major events connected to the Greek crisis. Once we 
confirm that the period is deluged by bad news, we may then argue with reasonable 
confidence that the realized search intensity for the specific sample is connected to rising 
spreads. By entering the above criteria in Google trends facility and focusing on the 
search intensity for news and headlines, two candidate periods are determined: (i) from 
January 2010 to June 2010, and (ii) from May 2011 to May 2013 (see Figure 1 below). We 
focus our attention on the most recent period simply because of its extensive duration.   
Having established the study period (20/5/2011 to 09/5/2013 - 495 obs), the 
search intensity index (henceforth, 
tG ) for key-phrases related to the Greek debt crisis is 
retrieved from the Google Trends facility (http://www.google.com/trends/; date 
accessed: Monday 3 November 2014). To select a cluster of queries capable of capturing 
                                                 
9 In this study, we condition upon four variables.  
10 We argue that the resulting search intensity after the joint usage of the above mentioned keywords 
(“Greece Crisis”+“Greek debt crisis”) is capable of identifying a period dominated by bad news.  
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the web search interest that is directly related to the Greek debt crisis, it is essential to 
identify a key-phrase that explicitly describes the subject of interest. Naturally, we choose 
as a suitable key-phrase the expression “Greek debt crisis”. Armed with that key-phrase, 
Google trends suggests analogous queries classifying them in terms of relevance (the 
relevance index receives values from 0 to 100). Based on these suggestions, we select all 
top queries (with relevance index>90) as directly related searches to the topic of our 
interest.11 The recommended queries are: “Greece debt crisis”, “Greece debt”, “the 
Greek crisis” and “Greece crisis”.12, 13  
Furthermore, special care must be given to the treatment of the search operators. 
For instance, by querying “Greece debt”, the results may embody supplementary related 
terms (e.g. “Greece debt crisis”) apart from the inclusion of “Greece” and “debt”(in any 
sequence). Given a set of queries, overlapping may be a severe threat (e.g. the query 
“Greece debt” may contain the search phrase “Greece debt crisis”). To overcome this 
concern, all queries are enclosed in quotation marks so only the exact term is used. The 
usage of quotation marks indirectly permits us to minimize the “contamination” of the 
tG  index by search queries which are related to incidences of positive news. The indirect 
obstruction of search intensity related to good incidents, is taking place through the 
exclusion of terms that can alter the physiognomy of the search query. For example, the 
phrase “Greece debt” signifies predominantly search intensity for bad news while the 
phrase “Greece debt deal” suggests mostly search intensity for good news. Thus, for the 
extraction of the 
tG  index, the search is specified as follows: “Greek debt 
crisis”+“Greece debt crisis”+“Greece debt”+“the Greek crisis”+“Greece crisis”. The 
selected geographic area is worldwide and the language used is English.14 
                                                 
11 All the subsequent top queries (apart from those selected) illustrate relevance index below or equal to 35. 
12 To confirm the validity of the proposed queries, we also make use of an additional Google facility, 
namely Google correlate. Given that the facility does not offer correlated searches on a global basis, we 
seek similar queries for the key-phrase “Greek debt crisis” in the US, Canada and UK. The results reveal 
that the initially proposed queries indeed belong into the top 10 most related searches for all examined 
countries. 
13 The G
t
 index is available at a weekly frequency; we convert the series to daily frequency using the 
quadratic-match average method. 
14 Undeniably, a more complete treatment demands integration of the related web search activity which is 
conducted in other European languages (notably because different exposure on Greek debt of the banking 
sector exists in different countries). As a result, we try to identify web search activity for the translated term 
“greek debt crisis” in six different languages, namely German (griechische schuldenkrise), French (crise de la dette 
grecque), Italian (crisi del debito greco), Spanish (crisis de la deuda griega), Greek (ελληνική κρίση χρέους) and 
Portuguese (crise da dívida grega). For every translated phrase, the Google trends facility indicates not enough 
search volume in order to deliver data. This may be attributed to the fact that (i) the prevailing language in 
the web is English and (ii) the majority of web users from these countries have knowledge of the English 
language and are therefore able to execute Google searches in English.  
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We note that for a selected key-phrase or a group of key-phrases, Google trends 
does not deliver the exact volume of queries but rather a normalized index of search 
intensity. The normalization is conducted as follows: the search volume associated to the 
query of interest V qt  for a given time unit (day, week or month) is expressed as a fraction 
(
tr ) of the entire search volume of queries ,V
q
e t  that correspond to the same time unit 
(day, week or month). At a second stage the data is scaled through the multiplication of 
every fraction (obtained after the normalization process) by the scaling factor F= *100 / r , 
where *r  is the fraction with the highest value, that is:  
 
*{ }max{ }
t
t
r
rr


R
          (6) 
The finally constructed normalized series for a single key-phrase (or n multiple key- 
phrases) can be depicted as follows:  
e,
*
100
q q
t t
t
V V
r
S   or  
, e,
1
*
100
n
q q
i t t
i
t
V V
r

 
 
 
 
 
 

S          (7) 
Naturally, the resulting index of search intensity receives values that range within 
the interval [0, 100]. The lower limit of the interval signifies inconspicuous search 
intensity, while the upper limit of the interval indicates the maximum observed search 
intensity. Finally, provided that the delivered index is unaffected by ,V
q
e t  over time, the 
comparison of different observations for the same index becomes more meaningful and 
therefore any subsequent analysis more robust. Figure 2 plots the 
tG  index. 
As a second online activity index with respect to the Greek crisis we use the total 
number of mentions for the keyword “#Grexit” in the Twitter, Facebook and Google 
blogs (source: http://analytics.peoplebrowsr.com/; date accessed: Monday 3 November 
2014). To allow direct comparison (apples-to-apples) with the respective Google trends 
data, the sample size for our analysis is determined based on the Google trends search 
intensity index for the key-word “Grexit”. Therefore, the sample period extends from 
04/5/2012 to 21/3/2013 (220 observations).15 Figure 3 plots jointly for the Twitter, 
Facebook and Google blogs the total number of mentions (henceforth, 
tT ) for the key-
word “#Grexit”. The Twitter (Facebook) data refer to the total number of users 
mentioning in their tweets (posts) the key-word “#Grexit”, including also re-tweets (re-
posts). Similarly, the Google blogs data refer to the total number of users mentioning the 
                                                 
15 Given that the second sample is a subset of the first sample, we argue that this second type of online 
activity is also linked to rising spreads. 
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keyword “#Grexit”. Finally, the selected geographic area is worldwide and the dataset 
includes tweets or posts that can be in any language.   
Empirical studies that focus on the determinants of sovereign yield spreads 
introduce a wide range of explanatory variables. These are classified into two broad 
categories: international factors and idiosyncratic factors (see Oliveira et al. 2012; Hilscher 
and Nosbusch, 2010). Commonly used international factors include: (i) the international 
risk aversion level captured by the implied volatility of the S&P 500 - VIX index (Beber 
et al. 2009; Gerlach et al. 2010; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012) or by the difference 
between the US corporate bonds yield and the 10-year US sovereign bonds yield 
(Codogno et al. 2003), (ii) global liquidity conditions proxied by the TED spread 
(Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010) or by the US Federal Funds Rate (Csonto and 
Ivaschenko, 2013), and (iii) the global cost of capital proxied by the US bond yields 
(Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010; Maltritz, 2012). Frequently implemented idiosyncratic 
factors refer to macroeconomic variables capturing the country’s macroeconomic 
fundamentals as well as its overall credit risk rating (or probability of default) and 
liquidity risk (market size and depth). Macroeconomic variables include (amongst others) 
the debt-to-GDP ratio (Pagano and Von Thadden, 2004), the fiscal balance-to-GDP 
ratio (Schuknecht et al., 2009), the current account balance (Heinz and Sun, 2014), the 
inflation rate (Lemmen and Goodhart, 1999), the short-term interest rate (Schuknecht et 
al., 2009), the credit rating (Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2007) or probability of default 
(Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010). The role of liquidity risk, frequently measured by the 
bid-ask spread differential, is recognized by several studies as limited (Geyer et al., 2004; 
Favero et al., 2010). Nevertheless, lack of attention towards liquidity risk has been cited 
by the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Eric Rosengren (2010) as one of 
the reasons explaining why the seriousness of the recent financial crisis was 
underestimated by economic forecasters; in fact, liquidity considerations have become a 
central issue in the literature only recently (see e.g. Angelini et al., 2011; Naes et al., 2011).  
Failure to account for factors that are crucial in shaping sovereign spreads and, at 
the same time, may also impact on the online search intensity and social media activity, 
could provide misleading causality inferences. Therefore, we condition upon a set of 
relevant variables. In particular, we use two international factors that capture Eurozone 
and global risk and two idiosyncratic factors that capture country-specific default risk 
(also reflecting country-specific macroeconomic position) and country-specific liquidity 
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risk. On top of these factors, and given our interest in web activity, we extend previous 
work by accounting for the effects of web-traced information. 
For the sovereign spreads and their determinants discussed above we use daily 
time-series data over the period 20/5/2011 to 09/5/2013. The sovereign spread (
jtS ) 
between the 10-year government bond yield in Eurozone peripheral country j  ( j = 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, France and the Netherlands) and the German 
government bond yield is available from Datastream; see Figure 4.16, 17  
We proxy the default risk ( jtD ) by the difference between the 10-year Credit 
Default Swap (CDS) premia in country j  and the 10-year German CDS premia 
(available from Datastream; see Figure 5).18 We proxy liquidity risk ( jtL ; see Figure 6) 
using the differential between the bid-ask spread of the 10-year bond in country j  and 
the bid-ask spread of the 10-year German bond (see e.g. De Santis, 2014; Favero et al., 
2010). Following De Santis (2014, 2012) and Schwarz (2014), we also use (from 
Bloomberg) the spread between the 10-year KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) bond 
yield and the 10-year German government bond yield as a proxy for the Eurozone area 
common risk factor (
tE ); see Figure 6. KfW are German agency bonds. These bonds are 
less liquid than the federal government ones; however, KfW bonds carry the same 
default risk as they are fully guaranteed by the German federal government. Therefore, 
any difference should reflect “flight-to-liquidity” and “flight-to-safety” considerations.  
We follow Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) in proxying international risk by the 
VIX  index. As an alternative and broader measure, we use the Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis Financial Stress Index ( FSI ) which is a composite index of 18 financial 
variables (including VIX ); see Figure 7.19 Finally, the data for France and the Netherlands 
in Figures 4 to 6 have been included in our analysis for comparison purposes.  
 
                                                 
16 Nonlinear unit root tests (Kapetanios et al., 2003) support stationarity for Sjt and the web search indices 
(detailed results are available upon request). 
17 GARCH effects might be present in the sovereign spreads (Figure 4). Bodart and Candelon (2009) 
demonstrate that the B&C test is not sensitive to the presence of volatility clustering. 
18 To proxy the default risk of Greece, we use the difference between the equally weighted sum of the 10-
year Credit Default Swap (CDS) premia for two major Greek banks (Alpha Bank and National Bank of 
Greece) and the 10-year German CDS premia. Greek debt restructuring (in February 2012) triggered the 
payment of Greek CDS in March 2012. Since then, these series has been discontinued. For this reason, we 
use the CDS information on Greece’s two major banks which are positively correlated (0.58) with the 
Greek CDS. 
19 FSI is available at a weekly frequency; we convert the series to daily frequency using the quadratic-match 
average method. 
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4. Empirical results 
Using the B&C test, we disentangle short- and long-run predictability among the 
variables of interest. To implement the B&C test, depending on the examined hypothesis 
each time, target or causing variable may be one of the jtS , tG  or tT . Following the 
notation of Section 2, the 
tm  vector, upon which we condition, includes four variables 
and more specifically proxies for idiosyncratic default risk ( jtD ), liquidity risk ( jtL ), 
Eurozone risk (
tE ) and international risk ( tVIX  or tFSI ). For the projection of the tm  
vector as well as for the projection of both the target and the causing variables into the 
1 2( , , , ,...)t t t tH S G  z z  and the 1( , ,...)t tH w w , respectively, the optimal lag-length 
selection is based on the Schwarz information criterion. Empirical models that use the 
tG  index are estimated over the period 20/5/2011 to 09/5/2013 whereas empirical 
models that use the 
tT  index are estimated over the period 04/5/2012 to 21/3/2013. 
The results for Greece (with and without conditioning) are presented in Figures 8 
to 11. The null hypothesis of no predictability running from 
tG  towards ,Greece tS   is 
rejected for the bivariate B&C measure, at the 0.05 significance level, when ω[0.09π, 
0.74π]  [0.85π, π], (Figure 8). This implies that medium size and high frequencies of tG , 
with wave lengths of less than 2.36 days (2π/ω=6.28/2.66=2.36) as well as between 2.70 
and 21.66 days, are those that offer predictive power with respect to ,Greece tS  . When the 
B&C test is re-conducted, after the Hosoya’s (2001) conditioning approach, the revealed 
predictability pattern is comparable to the bivariate case irrespective of which 
international risk proxy is employed (
tVIX  or tFSI ). The range of frequencies in which 
predictability is supported in the case where tFSI  is used, correspond to cyclical 
components with wave lengths of less than 2.07 days (ω[0.97π, π]) and between 2.68 
and 22.43 days (ω  [0.09π, 0.75π]). When tVIX  is used, predictability is revealed for 
wave lengths of less than 2.23 days (ω[0.90π, π]) and between 2.62 and 21.66 days 
(ω [0.09π, 0.76π]). Raggedly, it can be argued that the short-run cyclical components of 
the 
tG  index with wave lengths of less than three weeks are capable of offering 
additional information with respect to the future movements of ,Greece tS  . At the same 
time, there is no credible evidence of long-run causality. On the other hand, the null 
hypothesis of no causality at the opposite direction ( ,Greece tS   → tG ) is not rejected for 
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the entire range of frequencies. The latter also holds when conditioning takes place (see 
Figure 10).   
The same testing procedure (with and without conditioning; with the same control 
variables) is implemented to the Twitter, Facebook and Google Blogs index (number of 
mentions) in order to assess its impact on the Greek spreads. The non-Granger causality 
hypothesis running from 
tT  to ,Greece tS   is rejected for the bivariate B&C measure at the 
0.05 significance level when ω[0.63π, 0.67π] [0.88π, π]; see Figure 9. The above 
mentioned frequency ranges correspond to wave lengths of less than 2.28 days and 
between 2.98 and 3.16 days. Therefore, only short-run causality is established. Similar 
pattern as above, with relatively larger range of frequencies, contributing significantly in 
the prediction of ,Greece tS  , is uncovered under the Hosoya’s (2001) conditioning 
approach. In particular, conditioning under the 
tFSI  index indicates significant 
predictability for wave lengths of less than 2.35 days and between 3.12 and 4.00 days. 
Similarly, in the case where 
tVIX  is included in tm  predictability exists for wave lengths 
of less than 2.35 days and between 3.31 and 4.03 days. Additionally, we find empirical 
evidence to support the reverse hypothesis mainly in medium-run frequencies; the same 
holds even when we condition upon the set of variables included in 
tm  (see Figure 11). 
For the bivariate B&C measure significant predictability is established between 2.33 and 
2.96 days (ω[0.68π, 0.86π]). In the case where in tm  we include tVIX  the predictability 
period is defined within the range of 3.74 and 5.02 days (ω [0.40π, 0.54π]), while the 
respective period when 
tFSI  is used lies between 4.00 and 4.91 days (ω[0.41π, 0.50π]). 
The results for Greece are summarized in Table 1 below (Table 1 does not present the 
findings of the reverse hypothesis).  
The asymmetry in the findings of the reverse causality ( ,Greece tS   tG  and 
,Greece tS   tT ) can be characterized at first glance as puzzling. Such evidence may be 
puzzling if we assume homogeneous profile (in terms of education and capacity to 
comprehend economic topics) for the users of both data sources. Provided that Google 
is used by a wide range of users, a small fraction of those is anticipated to comply with 
the profile described above and therefore their impact on search intensity due to the 
evolution of spreads is expected to be rather small. On the other hand, Twitter users (the 
number of “#Grexit” mentions primarily comes from Twitter) are more educated 
relative to Google users (Mitchell et al., 2012), implying that we expect a larger fraction of 
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users to meet the profile described above. It appears that, for the case of Greece, the size 
of the fraction of users meeting the profile above is large enough to verify causality from 
spreads towards the number of “#Grexit” mentions.20  
Figures 12-19 report our findings for the remaining GIIPS whereas a summary of 
all results for the GIIPS is reported in Table 1. For the 
tG  index we find credible 
evidence of predictability mainly for Ireland (Figure 12) and to a much lesser extent for 
Italy (Figure 13), while no predictability is confirmed for Portugal (Figure 14) and Spain 
(Figure 15). For the case of Ireland the range of frequencies for the bivariate B&C 
measure in which predictability is established, corresponds to cyclical components with 
wave lengths between 5.66 and 13.08 days. When conditioning is taking place and 
tFSI  
is utilized as proxy for international risk predictability exists for wave lengths of less than 
2.95 days and between 8.16 and 12.08 days. The respective period for 
tVIX  is between 
7.39 and 12.31 days. For Italy predictability exists only in the bivariate B&C measure 
between 3.19 and 3.76 days; on the other hand, once conditioning takes place, 
predictability vanishes for the entire range of frequencies.  
For the 
tT  index, we find convincing evidence of short-run predictability only for 
Ireland, while the evidence for Italy, Portugal and Spain is feeble and non-systematic. For 
the case of Ireland (Figure 16) and the bivariate B&C measure the range of frequencies in 
which predictability is established, correspond to cyclical components with wave lengths 
between 2.33 and 2.49 days as well as between 3.19 and 4.49 days. In the case where the 
conditioning process includes 
tFSI  predictability is verified for wave lengths between 
2.38 and 2.71 days as well as between 3.12 and 4.58 days. When 
tVIX  is used the 
respective period is defined between 2.28 and 2.66 days as well as between 3.17 and 4.19 
days. Concerning Italy (Figure 17), Portugal (Figure 18) and Spain (Figure 19), a common 
pattern is revealed, since predictability in high frequencies is verified only when the 
conditioning vector includes the 
tFSI  variable. For Italy and Spain, evidence of 
predictability exists for wave lengths between 2.21 and 2.41 days and between 2.32 and 
2.53 days, respectively. Finally, for Portugal predictability occurs for wave lengths 
between 2.26 and 2.80 days and between 4.72 and 5.02 days. In any other case, no 
                                                 
20 When we examine the reverse causality for the remaining GIIPS, we find evidence of significant short-
run predictability only for the case of Italy, but the significance vanishes once conditioning is taking place 
(especially when the VIX  index is used). The results are available upon request. We are grateful to an 
anonymous reviewer for pointing this dimension. 
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significant causality occurs for the entire range of frequencies (see Table 1 for a 
summary).21   
A point of caution is that we cannot compare directly for each country the 
causality results for 
tG  with those of tT , since the construction of these two indexes is 
based on a different set of key-words/key-phrases (multiple key-phrases for 
tG  and a 
single key-word for 
tT ). To execute apples-to-apples comparison, we need to isolate the 
same key-word (“Grexit” in our case) from both sources of data and for the same time 
period. By conducting the above exercise for a sample size that coincides with the period 
in which significant search volume exists in Google Trends for the key-word “Grexit” 
(see Section 3), we may argue that the two different sources of data result to qualitative 
similar causality inference. In particular, no causality exists for Italy, Portugal and Spain 
while significant causality in relatively high frequencies is established for Greece and 
Ireland. The identified causality for both countries is clearly more pronounced for the 
tT  
index.22  
For comparison reasons, Figures 20 to 23 report our results for France and the 
Netherlands. What we find is no causality of the volume of activity in social media ( tT ) 
and web search intensity (
tG ) on the sovereign spreads of France and the Netherlands. 
Therefore, our findings suggest that borrowing costs in a set of Eurozone’s core 
countries (in this case France and the Netherlands) remained immune to social media 
and Google queries information related to the Greek crisis. 
Hence, there is evidence of short-run predictability for Ireland (stemming from 
both 
tG  and tT ) and sporadic evidence of predictability (sensitive to the information set 
used) for Portugal (stemming from tT ), Italy (stemming from both tG  and tT ) and Spain 
(stemming from tT ). It goes without saying that these results should be treated with 
caution. Ireland, whose economic share in the Eurozone output is smaller than that of 
Greece was the second peripheral country (after Greece) to be bailed-out. Arguably then, 
bad news circulated via online activity is more likely to impact negatively on smaller 
                                                 
21 Given our interest in GIIPS, and following a reviewer’s suggestion, we re-conducted the entire empirical 
part of the paper (without conditioning) by constructing a new search intensity index which has as a 
starting point the key-phrase “euro crisis”. Adopting the same sample period, the request, which has been 
performed in the Google trends facility for the formation of the index, is the following: “euro crisis”+“the 
euro crisis”+“euro debt”+“euro debt crisis”+“euro in crisis”. The derived results revealed that swapping 
the term Greece (or Greek) with the term Euro does not appear to increase, in any significant way, the 
predictive power of the search intensity index with respect to the spreads for the GIIPS. Detailed results 
are available upon request.  
22 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. The results are available upon request. 
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peripheral countries especially if the latter have very weak fiscal positions. In fact, Ireland 
recorded a much higher fiscal deficit than Greece, Italy Portugal and Spain during the 
2010-2011 period.23  
In addition, exposure of banks in peripheral countries to Greek public and private 
debt might also explain why there is some evidence of predictability for the GIIPS. 
Indeed, Bank of International Settlements (BIS) data showed that in June 2011,24 
Portuguese banks had some $10.08bn exposure (or 6.73% of their total exposure around 
the world) followed by a $3.88bn exposure (or 0.40% of total exposure) for Italian banks, 
$0.77bn (or 0.21% of total exposure) for Irish banks and $1.22bn (or 0.1% of total 
exposure) for Spanish banks. Following the Greek debt restructuring, the exposure to 
Greek debt was reduced; yet, Portuguese banks, followed by Italian banks, remained 
more exposed to Greek debt than the others. According to the latest BIS data (published 
in June 2013), the exposure of Portuguese banks to Greek debt had dropped, in 
December 2012, to $7.34bn (or 6.16% of their total exposure around the world). The 
exposure of Italian banks to Greek debt had dropped to $1.0bn (or 0.12% of total 
exposure), for the Irish banks to $0.11bn (or 0.07% of total exposure) and for the 
Spanish banks to $0.76bn (or 0.05% of total exposure). This argument is in line with the 
evidence of Mink and de Haan (2013) who rely on an event study approach and employ 
daily data to identify significant effects of news about the Greek bailout on stock price 
returns in European banks (irrespective of their exposure to the remaining GIPS; the 
definition of Mink and De Haan excludes Italy). They also find that that news about the 
Greek economic situation and the Greek bailout has led to abnormal returns on 
sovereign bonds for the GIPS with a larger impact in the case of Portugal and a lower 
impact in the case of Ireland and Spain. 
To sum up, we show that Greek debt crisis related information in social media and 
Google search queries does influence financial markets. This is mainly so for Greece and 
Ireland, and to a much lesser extent for Italy, Portugal and Spain.  This could be viewed 
as a weak signal of contagion from Greece to (some of) the remaining GIIPS in the sense 
that social media discussion and Google search queries related to the Greek debt crisis 
carry some predictive information for the cost of borrowing in other peripheral 
Eurozone economies. Noting that economists disagree on the definition of contagion 
                                                 
23 Irish fiscal deficit “hit” 30.5% of GDP in 2010 (this was due to the one-off impact of Government’s 
support to Irish banks; see OECD (2011): Economic Surveys Ireland) and then fell to 13.1% of GDP in 
2011. 
24 Data from Table 9B in http://www.bis.org/statistics/consstats.htm; date accessed: Monday 3 
November 2014.  
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and how it can be empirically tested (see Corsetti et al., 2011), our Greek-crisis related 
variables (
tG  and tT ) arguably comply with the thinking of Mink and de Haan (2013) 
who refer to contagion in terms of country-specific events and their impact on the asset 
prices of other countries.  
Given that the data used in our case are unwrought, further qualitative elaboration 
may be of fathomless importance in revealing more clearly the true linkage between 
Greek-crisis related social media/Google search queries and GIIPS spreads. With this in 
mind, our work, which relies on the B&C test, differs from recent work by Arghyrou and 
Kontonikas (2012) who use monthly data to identify contagion effects in terms of a 
significant direct and positive effect from the Greek spread on other Eurozone sovereign 
spreads and more so for the remaining GIIPS (with the effect being stronger for Ireland 
and Portugal), or recent work by De Santis (2012) who identifies contagion effects in 
terms of the direct impact of a Greek credit rating downgrade on other Eurozone 
sovereign spreads (the impact is again stronger for Portugal and Ireland). Our work also 
differs from Beetsma et al. (2013) who construct macroeconomic/financial news 
variables about the GIIPS (using information from the newsflash of Eurointelligence; an 
independent internet-based service which provides daily morning Euro-area news 
briefings of the European media) to conclude that bad news has increased sovereign 
yield differentials in the GIIPS and has triggered spillover effects to non-GIIPS 
countries. Finally, we also note the work of Di Cesare et al. (2013) who argue that recent 
movements in Eurozone spread differentials have increased to levels above those 
justified by economic fundamentals. Di Cesare et al. (2013) construct a monthly index of 
search volume of Euro break-up keywords (“end of Euro”, “end of the Euro”, “Euro 
break-up”, “Euro break”) and note that this index has a strong positive correlation of 
0.77 with the residual part of the 10-year Italian spread, that is, the part not explained by 
economic fundamentals (such as the deficit-to-GDP ratio, expected growth, the volatility 
of stocks in the banking sector and the volatility of the Italian spread).  
 
 
5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
This paper examines the long and short-run causality between Google search queries and 
social media data related to the Greek debt crisis and sovereign spreads in the GIIPS. We 
have five main findings. First, we identify short-run causality from social media and 
Google search queries data to the Greek and Irish spreads. Our evidence remains strong 
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even when a number of financial controls are accounted for. This might be due to the 
fact that spreads, social media/Google search queries and controls are all driven by the 
same unknown underlying process (for instance, expectations could play an important 
role). Second, there is evidence of short-run causality running from the Greek spread to 
social media discussion. This finding remains robust even when conditioning takes place. 
Third, there is some weak (and information-set sensitive) evidence of predictability of 
Greek-debt related social media discussion and Google search queries for Portuguese, 
Italian and Spanish spreads. Fourth, 
tG  carries different short-run predictive information 
relative to 
tT . Although Google is used by a wider base, social media (especially Twitter) 
have become a very popular way of keeping track of news and directing “followers” to 
news analysis (e.g. in blogs) in an extremely speedy way; this might explain why 
tT  
provides more pronounced evidence of short-run predictability for all the examined 
Eurozone peripheral countries in comparison to 
tG . Fifth, the borrowing costs in a set 
of Eurozone’s core countries (in this case France and the Netherlands) remained 
immune to social media/Google queries information related to the Greek crisis. 
A frequently made assumption is that the relationship between information 
demand and risk aversion is a positive one (see for instance Eeckhoudt and Godfroid 
2000). Although opposite views to the latter have been expressed, in this paper we focus 
on social media attention for the Greek crisis in terms of negative news25 which drive up 
spreads on the grounds that it reflects increased concerns about Greek debt sustainability 
and the future of the Eurozone. We therefore argue that social media information carries 
important predictive information for the bond market in periods characterised by 
negative economic news when traditional models that use only financial controls 
variables might prove inadequate. Given the very speedy way with which social media 
information is spread, our results arguably hint that social media information plays a vital 
role towards strengthening the efficient character of financial markets.  
The evidence we provide implicitly assumes the following order: increased social 
media activity (in terms of bad news) implies higher risk which, in turn, results in a higher 
spread.26 This very issue is arguably a hostage to fortune. Indeed, it suggests that the 
                                                 
25 Alternatively, frequently used terms include “animal spirits”, “market psychology” and self-reinforcing 
waves of pessimism and optimism (see the theoretical framework proposed by Angeletos and La’O, 2013).  
26 Vlastakis and Markelos (2012) confirm empirically for US stocks that investors demand more 
information as their level of risk aversion increases.  
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more policymakers talk about the Greek debt crisis, and hence the more the social media 
refer to it, the more spreads will rise.27  
Our paper looks at the contribution from information contained in social media 
towards predicting sovereign spreads, as opposed to the contribution of social media 
itself.  The latter question would however be intellectually interesting: how much mileage 
do we get from considering social media data in addition to more traditional measures of 
news intensity (e.g. number of related articles published that day). Indeed, it would be 
interesting to repeat the exercise conditioning on traditional news intensity measures 
once such measures will be easily and readily available. In that regard, the frequency of 
data (daily) we consider is somewhat limiting, as one of the points of a medium like 
Twitter is ultra-fast communication of very fresh news, and it would be interesting to 
explore higher frequency impacts, if any. We leave this issue for future research.28  
Overall, our empirical results suggest that unwrought data, effortlessly traced in 
social media, enclose valuable information content with respect to the short-run 
movements of financial markets. We do not argue that the intensity of searches or the 
number of mentions for a particular term is comparable to a sentiment index; rather, we 
flag the issue that it offers unexploited information which can be further utilized for 
improving our understanding of financial markets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 A similar argument was put forward by David Smith, Economics Editor of The Sunday Times. 
Commenting on the launch of the Bank of England's new ‘uncertainty gauge’, which pools information 
from a set of financial market indicators and the number of press articles citing economic uncertainty, 
Smith noted that as policymakers intensify their talk about uncertainty, journalists write more about it 
which, in turn, adds further to uncertainty and damages economic growth (Smith, 2013). 
28  We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this future research direction.   
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Table 1: How Google trends and social media predict 10-year sovereign spreads (
jtS ). 
Country 
j   
Predictability without 
conditioning 
 
Predictability with 
conditioning ( FSI ) 
 
Predictability with 
conditioning (VIX ) 
Panel A: Google search intensity predict spreads (
t
G  → 
jt
S ). All numbers below refer to days. 
Greece  ≤2.36 & [2.70-21.66]  ≤2.07 & [2.68-22.43]  ≤2.23 & [2.62-21.66] 
       
Ireland   [5.66-13.08]  ≤2.95 & [8.16-12.08]   [7.39-12.31] 
       
Italy   [3.19-3.76]       
       
Portugal           
       
Spain          
       
France          
       
Netherlands          
       
Panel B: Twitter, Facebook & Google Blogs number of mentions predict spreads (
t
T  → 
jt
S  ).  
Greece  ≤2.28 & [2.98-3.16]  ≤2.35 & [3.12-4.00]  ≤2.35 & [3.31-4.03] 
       
Ireland  [2.33-2.49] & [3.19-4.49]  [2.38-2.71] & [3.12-4.58]  [2.28-2.66] & [3.17-4.19] 
       
Italy      [2.21-2.41]    
       
Portugal     [2.26-2.80] & [4.72-5.02]    
       
Spain     [2.32-2.53]    
       
France          
       
Netherlands          
       
Note: The table reports the Breitung and Candelon (2006) predictability test without/with Hosoya’s (2001) 
conditioning. The symbol   denotes absence of predictability.  
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Figure 1. Google trends search intensity for news related to the Greek crisis 
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Figure 2. The 
tG  index 
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Note: PSI refers to Private Sector Involvement in the restructuring of Greek debt (February 2012). Greece, which was bailed-out twice 
(for €110bn in 2010 and then again for €109bn in 2011) negotiated, in February 2012, a new €130bn rescue package involving a 
voluntary haircut of some 53.5% on the face value of its bonds held by the private sector. Eurozone ministers agreed (in November 
2012) to cut Greece’s debt by a further €40bn. 
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Figure 3. Twitter, Facebook & Google blogs #Grexit mentions (
tT  index) 
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Figure 4. GIIPS, France and the Netherlands sovereign spreads  
0
10
20
30
40
50
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 01 02 03 04 05
2011 2012 2013
% points
time
Greece
Portugal
Ireland
Spain
FranceItaly
Netherlands
 
 
30 
 
 
Figure 5. GIIPS, France and the Netherlands default indices 
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Figure 6. GIIPS, France and the Netherlands liquidity risk & Eurozone risk factor 
0
4
8
12
16
20
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 01 02 03 04 05
2011 2012 2013
 Eurozone
 risk factor
liquidity risk
    proxy
 Eurozone
 risk factor
Greece
Portugal
Ireland
Italy Spain
France Netherlands
 
Note: Liquidity risk (Ljt) for country j is defined in terms of the percentage Bid-Ask spread: 
 
, ,
, ,
100* 100*
0.5*( ) 0.5*( )
jt jt Germany t Germany t
jt jt Germany t Germany t
Ask Bid Ask Bid
Ask Bid Ask Bid
    
          
, where Ask and Bid refer to the Ask and Bid price of the 10-
year government bond. 
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Figure 7. Proxies for international risk:FSI & VIX  
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Figure 8. 
tG  → ,Greece tS   Figure 9. tT  → ,Greece tS   
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Note: In Figure 8 the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, the B&C measure after Hosoya’s 
conditioning using FSI  and the B&C measure after Hosoya’s conditioning using VIX  is 8 in every case. Similarly, in Figure 9 the 
VAR lag length is 13 in every case. The grey area indicates joint statistical significance of the three plotted measures. 
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Figure 10. 
,Greece tS   → tG  Figure 11. ,Greece tS   → tT  
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Note: In Figure 10 the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, the B&C measure after Hosoya’s 
conditioning using FSI  and the B&C measure after Hosoya’s conditioning using VIX  is 8 in every case. Similarly, in Figure 11 the 
VAR lag length is 14, 13 and 13, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 12. 
tG  → Ireland, tS   Figure 13. tG  → Italy, tS   
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Note: In Figures 12-13, the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, the B&C measure after Hosoya’s 
conditioning using FSI  and the B&C measure after Hosoya’s conditioning using VIX  is 7 in every case. The grey area indicates joint 
statistical significance of the three plotted measures. 
 
Figure 14. 
tG  → Portugal, tS   Figure 15. tG  → Spain, tS   
0
2
4
6
8
10
0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.2
Statistic's
  value
frequency( 0,    ]π
significance area
0.05 significance threshold
non-significance area
B&C measure
          B&C measure
 after Hosoya's conditioning
        (VIX Index used)
         B&C measure
 after Hosoya's conditioning
(Financial Stress Index used)
0
2
4
6
8
10
0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.2
Statistic's
  value
frequency( 0,    ]π
0.05 significance threshold
significance area
non-significance area
B&C measure
          B&C measure
 after Hosoya's conditioning
        (VIX Index used)
         B&C measure
 after Hosoya's conditioning
(Financial Stress Index used)
 
Note: In Figure 14 the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, the B&C measure after Hosoya’s 
conditioning using FSI  and the B&C measure after Hosoya’s conditioning using VIX  is 6 in every case.. Similarly, in Figure 15 the 
VAR lag length is 7 in every case.  
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Figure 16. 
tT  → Ireland, tS   Figure 17. tT  → Italy, tS   
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Note: In Figures 16-17, the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, the B&C measure after Hosoya’s 
conditioning using FSI  and the B&C measure after Hosoya’s conditioning using VIX  is 13 in every case. The grey area indicates 
joint statistical significance of the three plotted measures. 
 
Figure 18. 
tT  → Portugal, tS   Figure 19. tT  → Spain, tS   
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Note: In Figure 18 the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, the B&C measure after Hosoya’s 
conditioning using FSI  and the B&C measure after Hosoya’s conditioning using VIX  is 13 in every case. Similarly, in Figure 19 the 
VAR lag length is 12 in every case. 
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Figure 20. 
tG  → France, tS   Figure 21. tG  → Netherlands, tS   
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In Figures 20-21, the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, the B&C measure after Hosoya’s 
conditioning using FSI  and the B&C measure after Hosoya’s conditioning using VIX  is 7 in every case. 
 
Figure 22. 
tT  → France, tS   Figure 23. tT  → Netherlands, tS    
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Note: In Figure 22 the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, the B&C measure after Hosoya’s 
conditioning using FSI  and the B&C measure after Hosoya’s conditioning using VIX  is 4 in every case. Similarly, in Figure 23 the 
VAR lag length is 4,4 and 3, respectively. 
 
 
